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1 In the wake of the recent mid-term elections, this book makes interesting reading. David
Farber's overall  argument here,  as emphasised by the title,  is  that conservatism as a
recognisable  political  movement,  ranging  from Robert  Taft  in  the  1930s  through  to
George W. Bush in the 2000s, has entered a period of decline. This could be a strong dose
of (academic, liberal) wishful thinking, or, possibly, the author is on to something, but the
American voter hasn’t realised it yet.The crucial point is of course the rise and fall of
American conservatism, as if this movement, originating essentially in opposition to the
New Deal, is now largely spent. In the conclusion the author comments: “As I write these
last sentences, the conservative political movement, some seventy years in the making, is
in disarray,  waiting for  new champions or,  perhaps,  simply changing circumstances”
(261). But the book is in no way made obsolete by recent Republican successes. On the
contrary, it puts things in a new perspective.
2 Farber approaches the topic by homing in on six individuals central to the conservative
cause: Taft, William Buckley, Barry Goldwater, Phyllis Schlafly, Ronald Reagan, and Bush.
The starting point for this investigation is, in Farber's words, “the search for order in
American  politics,”  a  motif  that  he  admits  is  rather  unfashionable  among American
historians more attuned to examine the “the struggle for equality” (3). The two strands of
thinking, and of political motivation, have often been at loggerheads over the past 80
David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short Hist...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2010-2 | 2010
1
years,  and they remain so to the present day.  Farber's  claim that conservatism is  in
disarray therefore bears examination. 
3 The story begins with Taft – or, rather, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, since it was FDR's
New Deal  that  triggered the  birth of  modern conservatism.  Taft  first  used the  term
'Conservative' in 1938 when running for the Senate, and it was a term that he clung to
thereafter, it coming to refer to three principle themes: support for property-owners in
particular  and  economic  liberty  in  general  against  an  overbearing  government;
opposition to liberal  intellectual  elites and their desire to change US society ‘for the
better’; and, although not paramount, nevertheless a racial outlook on US society that
foreswore the qualities of the “Anglo-Saxon race.” Individual responsibility and ingenuity
were the keys to the success of American society – claiming hardship because of  race or
class was for Taft (and for most of the conservatives who came after him) only directing
energies down an ill-chosen path, and opening doors to let in new forms of tyranny. This
led him to oppose US involvement in World War II: It was not for Americans to fight for
the freedom of others, and neither did economics require US intervention abroad. This
put him out of step with many of his business supporters, although he recovered this lost
ground through the seminal piece of anti-union legislation, the Taft-Hartley Act, in 1947.
But  even  then  he  remained  an  outsider  in  his  own  party,  unable  to  combine  his
conservative messsage with a campaign convincing enough to position him as a credible
presidential  candidate.  In  1952,  in  his  final  attempt,  East  coast  internationalist
Republicans rejected Taft's semi-isolationist rhetoric and went instead for the moderate
Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
4 Taft may have laid the ground for a conservative movement in US politics, but his legacy
was  not  immediately  taken  up  by  others  on  Capitol  Hill.  Instead,  Farber  shifts  his
attention to William Buckley, the suave Yale graduate who took everything Taft had stood
for – individual liberty, a pro-business anti-union outlook, a rejection of Civil Rights – and
added  another  ingredient  that  would  be  decisive  later  –  Christianity.  Religion  is  an
essential element to the careers of several of these conservatives – Buckley and Schlafly
were Catholics, while Reagan and Bush would become born-again Protestants – as it gave
extra  meaning  to  their  cause,  as  well  as  a  useful  basis  for  arguing  against  'godless
liberalism', atheistic communism, and their tampering with the natural order of things
(for most conservatives in this book, liberalism and communism were pretty much the
same thing). But instead of running foroffice, Buckley bequeathed a vital new string to
the conservative bow – an understanding of the need to build an intellectual base, give
the movement a serious face, and lay the ground for electoral success one idea at a time.
This he did via the National Review and, later, the Young Americans for Freedom. 
5 Farber  is  very  good  in  delineating  the  painful  borders  of  this  nascent  conservative
movement. Thus Buckley supported McCarthy for laying bare the weaknesses of liberal
anti-communism, and he tried to “tiptoe” around the farthest reaches of the American
Right,  careful  not  to  alienate  potential  supporters  of  a  future  winning  conservative
coalition, such as the John Birch Society and white segregationists. Christian morality,
clearly, did not go so far as to recognise injustice in one's own backyard. The Federal
government  had  no  right  to  determine  what  states  could  legislate,  and  this  belief
remained solid, even it meant condoning racism (or, better said, never addressing racism
directly).  The author is also good at linking the outlook of these six individuals with
broader tides washing up through US society, and how the two would connect. Farber
chronicles  how various religious demagogues and anti-communist  ranters  plied their
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trade through the 1950s and 1960s, giving an idea of how they linked, via these seminal
figures, with the national political scene. The role of business is a constant active interest
group in  this  narrative,  from Taft's  original  backers  in  the  anti-New Deal  American
Liberty  League  through  to  the  Coors-funded  Mountain  States  Legal  Foundation  that
supported Schlafly. The publishing house Henry Regnery Company also makes several
appearances as an important conservative platform. 
6 Although Farber links Buckley with Goldwater, Buckley's closest conservative compatriot
in this book is probably Schlafly, for the reason that they both sought to mobilise the
conservative  grassroots  across  US  society  instead  of  running  for  office  themselves.
Buckley's  most  lasting  creation,  the  Young  Americans  for  Freedom,  mobilised  for
Goldwater's presidential bid in 1964, and his National Review benefactor, textile boss Roger
Milliken, backed it as well. When Goldwater was pummelled at the polls in 1964, the last
hurrah of the New Deal coalition, it was Schlafly who kept the light burning, first in the
National Federation of Republican Women and then, in the 1970s, in her remarkable (and
successful) campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment. In many ways Schlafly’s story
makes this book, because of how she was able to shift the argument away from the merits
of gender equality onto the ground that women are different, and they shouldn’t be equal
in order to be women. FDR’s shadow again hangs over the book (and US conservatism in
general) when Farber recounts Schlafly’s alterantive “four most vital freedoms: Freedom
to Keep our Religious Heritage, Freedom from Obscenity, Freedom from Criminal Attack,
and Freedom from Communist Conspiracy” (Farber is good in suggesting that, despite her
talents, Schlafly was not always so very far away from the “nut fringe”).
7 Goldwater’s greatest legacy however comes from the Republican shift towards the South
to take advantage of an anti-civil rights backlash against the Democrats, and this linked
him most with Reagan, who despite his moderation on race still went so far as to open his
presidential  bid  in  December  1979  with  a  speech  in  notorious  Neshoba  County,
Mississippi, site of the murders of three civil rights workers in 1964, which emphasised
states’ rights and little else. It was an unnecessary and opportunist slap on the back for
white racism, and fortunately Reagan never ventured that low for votes again. Reagan is
the anomaly in Farber’s group because (again the shadow) he voted for FDR four times
and was an avowed liberal up to the early 1950s – in his own words, “a New Dealer to the
core.” (165). Significantly, it was taxation that turned Reagan to the Right more than
anything,  with  religion  and  anti-communism  only  later  adding  to  his  particular
conservative mix. Goldwater also played a role – as co-chair of the presidential campaign
in California, Reagan delivered a watershed speech entitled ‘A Time for Choosing’ in Los
Angeles that would mark his entry into politics as a serious contender, and he would
prove a far more able communicator thatn Goldwater ever was. And by 1980 the Christian
Right was a formidable electoral force, something that Reagan was able to capitalise on.
8 By the time we reach Bush, the conservative tidal wave, according to Faber, is already
coming  apart  due  to  its  inconsistencies.  In  the  beginning  opposed  to  too  much
involvement abroad, Bush ended with two major wars on his hands, coupled with two
(failing) attempts at large-scale nation-building. A free market tax cutter to the core,
Bush saw the US economy nose-dive in 2007-2008 due to a desperate lack of regulation.
Farber emphasises the impact of faith as the basis of the Bush world-view, more so than
on that of Reagan, but he is less good on the rise of neoconservatism, giving it no more
than a paragraph (246). Whereas the chapters on Taft, Buckley, Goldwater, and Schlafly
did not have to deal with policy-making, those with Reagan and Bush do, and this makes
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it  difficult  for  the  author  to  cover  a  lot  of  ground in  order  to  assess  not  only  the
standpoint of his subjects but also their policy record. Nevertheless the book remains
readable throughout.
9 There is a theme running through the narrative from Buckley to Bush that is crystal clear
– America is constantly faced with all-encompassing threats to its values and well-being,
be that communism, or civil rights, or feminism, or gay rights, or taxation, or terrorism,
and it is up to the conservative sear to bring that message home to the people in order to
open their eyes and lead them to salvation, whatever the cost. As Goldwater put it so
succinctly, “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And
let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” (111).With
the Tea Party in mind it would be easy to say Farber is grossly mistaken in his ‘rise and
fall’ thesis, but then again, his point is that modern US conservatism developed a set of
beliefs that did come crashing down under Bush. What we see now is no more than a
destructive politics of opposition, an unwillingness to compromise on anything because
compromise is weak.  This is  a far cry from the origins of the movement under Taft.
Whether the disparate positions of the Tea Party and the Republican Right develop into
something coherent and constructive remains to be seen.
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